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An expanded model of value in cooperative games is presented in which value
has either a linear or a proportional mode, and NTU value has either an
input or an output basis. In TU games, the modes correspond to the Shapley
(1953) and proportional (Feldman (1999) and Ortmann (2000)) values. In
NTU games, the Nash (1950) bargaining solution and the Owen-Maschler
(1989, 1992) value have a linear mode and an input basis. The egalitarian
value (Kalai and Samet (1985)) has a linear mode and an output basis. The
output-basis NTU proportional value (Feldman (1999)) and the input-basis
variant, identiﬁed here, complete the model.
The TU proportional value is shown to have a random marginal contribution
representation and to be in the core of a positive convex game. The output-
basis NTU variant is shown to be the unique eﬃcient Hart and Mas-Colell
consistent NTU value based on equal proportional gain in two-player TU
games. Both NTU proportional values are shown to be equilibrium payoﬀs
in variations of the bargaining game of Hart and Mas-Colell (1996). In these
variations, players’ probabilities of participation at any point in the game
are a function of their expected payoﬀ at that time. Limit results determine
conditions under which players with zero individual worth receive zero value.
Further results show the distinctive nature of proportional allocations to play-
ers with small individual worths. In an example with a continuum of players
bargaining with a monopolist, the monopolist obtains the entire surplus.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C7.
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In cooperative games, players bargain over the distribution of the gains from cooperation.
The Shapley (1953) value is an important model of how these gains might be distributed
in TU (transferrable utility) games. Myerson (1977) characterizes the Shapley value in a
model that assigns equal gains to players forming bilateral cooperation agreements. Hart
and Mas-Colell (1989) show a related equal gain property of Myerson (1980) is intimately
related to consistency and the existence of a diﬀerence potential in TU and NTU (non-
transferrable utility) games. These results are used to characterize the Shapley and
egalitarian (Kalai and Samet (1985)) values. Ortmann (2000) deﬁnes a ratio potential,
derives the TU proportional value, and characterizes it through consistency with equal
proportional gain bargaining in two-player games. In Feldman (1999), I derive similar
and additional results for TU and NTU games.
This paper proposes a dual model of cooperative value. Equal and proportional divi-
sion are generally considered to be the two fundamental models of fairness in allocation
(see, e.g., Adams (1965), Homans (1977), Thompson (1998), or Young (1994)). The
dual model identiﬁes these methods with two modes of value allocation: linear and pro-
portional. Substantive meaning is given to this duality by demonstrating properties of
the proportional value and by providing TU and NTU characterizations of it and re-
lated values based on consistency, the Myerson (1977) bilateral cooperation model, and
noncooperative implementation.
The principal characterizations are provided by a variation on the Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996) noncooperative bargaining game. This variation uses a proposed payoﬀ-weighted
participation mechanism. Participation means making a proposal. Equilibrium payoﬀs
in TU games correspond to the proportional value when the probability of participation
at any point in the game is proportional to a player’s average proposed payoﬀ at that
time. In the original game, players have equal probability of participation and payoﬀs
correspond to the Shapely value in TU games, the Owen-Maschler (1989, 1992) value in
NTU games, and the Nash (1950) bargaining solution in pure bargaining games.
The noncooperative characterization suggests that the proportional value provides a
simple model of endogenous bargaining power in cooperative games. Bargaining power
is endogenous in the sense that a player’s degree of participation is a function of its
individual endowment and the endowments of its coalitions. In contrast, the linear mode
can be seen to reﬂect a model of formal equality in participation. Note, however, that all
players in proposed payoﬀ-weighted participation games have the same ability to reject
proposals as players in the original Hart and Mas-Colell game.
In the dual model, NTU value also has a basis. The basis determines how alloca-
tions are compared. Input-basis allocation rules function as if players bargain over the
resources allocated to them, rather than the utility they receive. The Nash bargaining
solution and the Owen-Maschler value have an input basis. The coalitional resources
necessary to implement a player’s input-basis allocation are priced by the marginal rates
of transformation of player’s utilities. These are determined by the ¸-weights generatedby the hyperplane supporting an eﬃcient allocation. In contrast, output-basis allocation
rules function as if players bargain directly over the utility they receive. The egalitarian
value and the proportional value have an output basis. The logic of the dual model
implies that there should also be a value with proportional mode and an input basis.
This value is identiﬁed with the noncooperative game. In pure bargaining games, this
value becomes a proportional analog of the Nash bargaining solution, completing the
dual model. The egalitarian value is also implemented here.
Mode and basis are shown to be independent in NTU games. A player’s probabil-
ity of participation is independent of its average proposed payoﬀ in the linear mode,
but varies with it in the proportional mode. Similarly, participation is independent of
a player’s ¸-weight with input-basis values, but varies with it in output-basis values.
Thus, participation probabilities for implementing the output-basis proportional value
are proportional to ¸-weighted average proposed payoﬀs.
Several implications of proportional value allocation are studied. Players with zero
individual worth, zero players, are shown to receive zero value if the coalition of all zero
players has zero worth as well. Since the proportional value is not deﬁned on games
with zero coalitional worths, this result is in the limit as the worth every coalition of
zero players goes to zero. The intuition from the bargaining game is that players with
small individual worth have low probability of selection to propose in two-player stage
games. Backward induction then determines the outcome. However, when the coalition
of zero players has positive worth, the total allocation to zero players is positive. Results
for zero players are generalized to games with small players. Conditions are developed
under which these results, in turn, generalize to hierarchical classes of small players whose
proportional value allocations are hierarchical as well.
An example demonstrating the relevance of the proportional mode to economic theory
is provided by a game in which one large player and a variable number of small players
engage in joint production. Under proportional value allocation, the share of proﬁts
obtained by the small players converges downward to their minimum core allocation as
the number of small players grows, as should be expected. Under Shapley value allocation
and constant returns to scale, and in the limit, the allocation to the large player is half
its proportional value allocation. The total Shapley value allocation to small players in
excess of their minimal core allocation is then equal to the larger player’s excess allocation,
implausibly implying that, in some sense, they have equal total bargaining power.
One objection to the dual model could be that only linear-mode input-basis value
allocations are invariant to aﬃne transformation of players’ utility functions. In the pro-
portional mode, translations lead to changes in allocations because they imply changes
in the reference points for determining proportional gains. Rescalings of player’s utility
functions lead to changes in output-basis value allocations as well, because player’s util-
ities are regarded as directly comparable. Invariance has no special status in the dual
model. Instead, changes in real allocations resulting from aﬃne transformations are un-
derstood to result from implied changes in interpersonal comparisons that arise naturally
in the bargaining process. The conclusion expands on this perspective.
2Section 2 of this paper deﬁnes the TU and output-basis NTU proportional values.
Classical value properties are demonstrated, including random marginal contribution
representation and inclusion in the core of a convex game. Section 3 characterizes the
NTU proportional value through consistency. Section 4 develops a coalition formation
result and presents the characterization based on the Myerson (1977) bilateral cooper-
ation model. Section 5 presents the noncooperative implementations and identiﬁes the
input-basis proportional value. Section 6 considers games with zero and small players.
Section 7 presents the production example. The conclusion and an appendix collecting
several proofs follow.
2 The Proportional Value
2.1 Deﬁnition in TU and NTU Games
Let N be a set of n players in a TU cooperative game v in characteristic function form.
Any coalition S µ N in such a game has a scalar worth v(S). Let s = jSj be the number
of players in S. The worth of Ø, the empty set, is zero. Generally, TU games will be
required to be positive, i.e., v(S) > 0 for S 6= Ø. Section 6 shows how the proportional
value can be extended to games having coalitions with zero worth. The restriction of v
to an S µ N is represented by the pair (S;v). Thus, (N;v) = v and (T;v)(S) = v(S)
for T ¶ S. The operator “n” is used to indicate set subtraction of a player or coalition.
The immediate subcoalitions of S are the coalitions resulting from the removal of a single
player. Small coalitions are usually identiﬁed with an overbar: i.e. i = fig and ij = fi;jg.
Let R(S) be the set of all orders of the players in S and let r = (r1;r2;:::;rs) 2 R(S)
be any such order. Then deﬁne Rr
i = frj : j · ig to be the coalition composed of the
ﬁrst i players in the order r.
The ratio potential of a positive TU cooperative game v is a function from v to the














Given v and any P(Ø;v) 6= 0, potentials for all other S µ N are uniquely determined.
The right-hand representation shows that the ratio potential of a coalition is the product
of its worth and the harmonic mean of the potentials of its immediate subcoalitions. The




The following lemma shows that the potential of a coalition is the harmonic mean of its
ordered worth products when P(Ø;v) = 1.
Lemma 2.1 For any positive TU game v, and for all S ½ N, S 6= Ø, the ratio potential






























Proof: The two formulations are equivalent because v(S) is common to all of the ordered worth
products on the left-hand side and factors out. If all potentials for coalitions of cardinality s¡1
satisfy the relation, then potentials of cardinality s must as well: Use the right-hand version
of equation (2.1) and insert potentials of the immediate subcoalitions of the ﬁrst form of the
lemma and the right-hand version of the lemma results. To complete the proof, observe that it
is clearly true for singleton coalitions: P(i;v) = P(Ø;v)v(i). ¤
The discrete derivative of the ratio potential of a coalition S with respect to a player
i 2 S in a game v is deﬁned as the ratio of the potential of S to the potential of the
immediate subcoalition of S without player i, coalition S n i:
D
iP(S;v) = P(S;v)=P(S n i;v): (2.2)
The proportional value of a positive TU game assigns each player the discrete deriva-



















Remark 2.1 The proportional value of a player is a ratio of harmonic means. A har-
monic mean may be considered a type of expectation. In this sense, the proportional value
is a player’s expected marginal proportional contribution.








v(ij) ¡ v(i) ¡ v(j)
¢
: (2.4)
Clearly, the gain from cooperation is shared in proportion to each player’s individual




v(1)v(12)v(13)(v(2)+v(3)) + v(2)v(12)v(23)(v(1)+v(3)) + v(3)v(13)v(23)(v(1)+v(2)):
Many results in this paper are obtained for the more general NTU bargaining envi-
ronment. In an NTU game V , the worth of a coalition S, V (S), is represented by a set
of feasible allocations. This set represents the utilities jointly achievable by the players
4in S and is a subset of RS, the s-dimensional Euclidean space indexed by the members
of S. For every S ½ N, S 6= Ø, V (S) must be comprehensive, closed, bounded, and
positive. Comprehensive means that if x 2 V (S) and y · x, then y 2 V (S) as well.
Closed means every convergent sequence in V (S) converges to a point in V (S). Bounded
means there is some y 2 RS such that for any x 2 V (S), x < y. Positive means there is
an x 2 V (S) such that x 2 RS
++. Section 6 shows how this constraint may be relaxed to
allow coalitions with zero worth. Except for positivity, these are the same conditions used
by Kalai and Samet (1985) in their characterization of the egalitarian value. An NTU
game in characteristic function form is a complete collection of worths for all S µ N.
The NTU ratio potential is a straightforward generalization of the TU ratio potential.
The TU condition (2.1) is modiﬁed to require that the discrete derivatives of the players
in any coalition S identify an allocation on the eﬃcient surface @V (S) of V (S). Given
(P(S n i;V ))i2S, the NTU ratio potential P(S;V ) is the unique scalar that satisﬁes
µ
P(S;V )
P(S n i;V )
¶
i2S
2 @V (S): (2.5)
If V represents a TU game, then (2.5) clearly reduces to (2.1). The output-basis NTU
proportional value for i in a positive NTU game V is
'i(V ) = D
iP(N;V ) = P(N;V )=P(N n i;V ): (2.6)
The input-basis NTU proportional value is deﬁned in Section 5.5.
2.2 Some Basic Properties of the Proportional Value
The proportional value has many properties classically associated with the Shapley value.
In this connection, note that formula (2.3) for the TU proportional value gives equal
weight to all possible orders of players. As is well known, the random arrival form of the
Shapley value also has this important property. This subsection presents some additional
properties of the proportional value. Reference to the NTU proportional value in this
section should be understood to be the output-basis proportional value.
Lemma 2.2 The proportional value is eﬃcient, symmetric, and unique.
Proof: TU eﬃciency follows directly from the deﬁnition of the ratio potential (2.1) and the
deﬁnition of ' (2.2). Since '(S;V ) 2 @V (S), the NTU proportional value must be at least
weakly Pareto eﬃcient. When V (S) is required to be nonlevel (i.e., allocations to all players
change moving any direction in @V (S)), then '(S;V ) must clearly be strongly Pareto eﬃcient.
Symmetry follows from the observation that any permutation of players’ labels must lead to the
same permutation of their value allocations. The TU proportional value is unique because it is
the ratio of two potentials and Lemma 2.1 shows that potentials scale linearly with P(Ø;v). It
is easily determined that the same must be true for the NTU potential and value. ¤
Let c 2 RN
++, deﬁne x¤ such that x¤
i = cixi, and let c ± V be the game where x¤ 2
(c ± V )(S) if and only if x 2 V (S). A value is scale invariant if Ái(c ± V ) = ciÁi(V ).
5Lemma 2.3 The proportional value is scale invariant in TU and NTU games.
Proof: Guess that P(S;c ± V ) = P(S;V )
Q
j2S cj. This is clearly true for n = 1. Assume it is
true for all T ( S. Then it must be true for S as well since (ci'i(S;V ))i2S 2 @(c ± V )(S) and
ci'i(S;V ) = fP(S;V )
Q
j2S cjg=fP(S n i;V )
Q
j2Sni cjg. ¤
Deﬁne a value to be monotonic if an increase in the worth of a coalition never re-
duces the value allocated to any of its players. For TU games, Á is weakly monotonic if
@Ái(v)=@v(S) ¸ 0 for S 3 i, and strongly so if the inequality is strict. This deﬁnition
is equivalent to that of Kalai and Samet (1985), but weaker than that of Young (1985).
Ortmann (2000), Proposition 4.2, demonstrates monotonicity of the proportional value
only with respect to v(N) in TU games.
Lemma 2.4 The proportional value is strongly monotonic in TU and weakly monotonic
in NTU games.
Proof: In the TU case, the potential is continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to the worths
of coalitions in a positive game. Equation (2.1) implies @P(S;v)=@v(S) > 0 for any S µ N.
Further, (2.1) also implies @P(R;v)=@P(S) > 0 for any R = S [ j, j 2 N n S. Induction and
the chain rule then imply @P(T;v)=@v(S) > 0 for any T ¶ S. On the other hand, if T 6¶ S
then P(T;v) is clearly independent of v(S) and @P(T;v)=@v(S) = 0. Thus, for any T ¶ S and
any i 2 T, (2.2) implies that @'i(T;v)=@v(S) > 0.
In NTU games an “increase” in V (S), an outward expansion of the eﬃcient surface, may
have no eﬀect on P(T;V ), S µ T µ N. To see this, let V 0 = V except that V 0(S) ¾ V (S) is
an enlargement of V (S) such that there is no y 2 V 0(S) such that for all i 2 S, yi > 'i(S;V ).
Then (2.5) requires that P(S;V 0) be unchanged, and therefore, no potentials will change and
the value allocation will not change. However, there is no way that an increase in V (S) can
lead to a decrease in P(T;V ) for S µ T µ N or aﬀect any P(T;V ) where S 6µ T. ¤
A value provides equal proportional gain to players if and only if the proportional
change in value to a player j from a second player k joining a coalition is equal to that
of k when j joins. This property is directly analogous to the “balanced contributions”
property of Myerson (1980), which is called “preservation of diﬀerences” in Hart and
Mas-Colell (1989). Ortmann deﬁnes a value with this property as “preserving ratios.”
Ortmann (2000) Theorem 2.6 characterizes the TU proportional value with this property.
This simpler proof applies also to NTU games.
Lemma 2.5 The proportional value is the unique eﬃcient value with the equal propor-
tional gain property in TU and NTU games:
'j(S;V )
'j(S n k;V )
=
'k(S;V )
'k(S n j;V )
:
Proof: The proportional value has the property since both ratios reduce to P(S;V )P(S n
jk;V ). Assume a second eﬃcient value Á also has the property. They must agree in two-player
6games. Let S be a coalition of smallest cardinality where they do not agree. Since they agree
for immediate subcoalitions, substitute potentials for values of immediate subcoalitions and
rearrange to get P(S n j;V )Áj(S;V ) = P(S n k;V )Ák(S;V ) for all j;k 2 S. Since Á(S;V ) 2
@V (S), P(S n i)Ái(S;V ) = P(S;V ) for all i 2 S and Á(S;V ) = '(S;V ) as well. ¤
A dummy player adds exactly its individual worth to every coalition. Let i be a
dummy player. In a TU game, for every S 3 i, v(S) = v(S n i) + v(i). Similarly, in an
NTU game, for every S 3 i, V (S) = V (S n i) £ V (i). The following lemma is proved
using a result for coalition structures developed in Section 4.
Lemma 2.6 If i is a dummy player, then 'i(S;v) = v(i) in TU games and 'i(S;V ) =
supfx 2 V (i)g in NTU games.
Proof: Let Q = fN n i;ig be a coalition structure. If i is a dummy player, then V=Q = V ,
where “/” is the reﬁnement operator of (4.1) and (4.2). By Lemma 4.1, below, P(S;V ) =
P(S n i;V )P(i;V ). Thus, 'i(S;V ) = P(i;V ) = supfx 2 V (i)g. The TU result is implied. ¤
A value is individually rational if and only if it always allocates a player at least its
individual worth. A game V is superadditive if, for any disjoint coalitions S and T, and
for every x 2 V (S) and every y 2 V (T), the joint vector (x;y) is in the feasible set of
the union: (x;y) 2 V (S [ T).
Lemma 2.7 The proportional value is individually rational in positive superadditive
games: If V is superadditive, then 'i(S;V ) ¸ supfx 2 V (i)g.
Proof: Take any game V and any i 2 N. Create a game V ¤ such that V ¤(S) = V (Sni)£V (i) if
i 2 S and V ¤(S) = V (S) if i 62 S. By the superadditivity of V , V ¤(S) µ V (S). By Lemma 2.6,
'i(S;V ) = supfx 2 V (i)g for every S 3 i, S µ N. Now, by Lemma 2.4, the conclusion follows
because V ¤ can be transformed into V by a sequence of games V1;V2;V3;:::;Vk, in which each
game in the sequence diﬀers from the immediately previous game by the enlargement of the
worth (feasibility set) of a single coalition S 3 i. If Vj(S) is enlarged by Vj+1(S) = V (S), then
Vj(S) ½ Vj+1(S), and for every other T µ N, Vk(T) = Vj+1(T). Thus 'i(S;Vj+1) ¸ 'i(S;Vj)
for every j < k and every S µ N. The TU result is implied. ¤
2.3 Random Marginal Contribution Representation and the TU
Core
The proportional value has a random marginal contribution representation. This implies
the proportional value is in the core of a positive convex TU game. The following lemma
is the basis for random marginal contribution representation. It is an obvious analog of
a well-known representation of the Shapley value (see e.g., P´ erez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2001)) and is closely related to the noncooperative implementation (compare with equa-
tions (5.2) and (5.3)). The lemma shows that the proportional value of a player i in a
coalition S is the weighted sum of i’s marginal contribution to S and i’s value in the
immediate subcoalitions of S. The weights for the subcoalitions are proportional to the
7values of the excluded players. In contrast, equal weighting deﬁnes the Shapley value. To
prove the lemma, represent values and v(S n i) in potential form on the right-hand-side
and simplify.











'j(S;v) 'i(S n j;v)
i
:
The next lemma provides a representation of the proportional value as a weighted
sum of marginal contributions. Recall coalition Rr
m is composed of the ﬁrst m players in
the order r 2 R(S), and let r(i) be i’s position in r.
















Proof: Deﬁne Mi(r) = v(Rr
r(i)) ¡ v(Rr
r(i)n i). Let the probability associated with any order




m). Assume 'k(S;v) =
P
ri2R(S) prS;iMk(ri).
The result clearly holds for s = 1. Assume it holds for all k 2 T ( S. Consider orders
rj 2 R(S) such that rj = (ri;q 2 S), e.g., q is added to ri 2 R(T = S n q). Then, by
Lemma 2.8, 'k(S;v) =
P
rj2R(S) prS;jMk(rj) for all k 2 S as well. By induction, it holds for
all S. Replace values in the probability formula by potentials and the result follows. ¤
Observe that the weight associated with any order r is independent of i. The following
reorganization of terms casts the proportional value in the standard Shapley value form.
















v(S) ¡ v(S n i)
´
:
A TU game v is convex if and only if v(S [ T) + v(S \ T) ¸ v(S) + v(T) for all
S;T µ N. Feldman (1999) shows only that the proportional value is in the core of a log
convex game, i.e., when ln v is convex.
Theorem 2.1 The proportional value is in the core of a positive convex TU game.
Proof: The convexity of v implies v(S [ i) ¡ v(S) ¸ v(S [ i n j) ¡ v(S n j), the increasing
marginal contributions of players. For any order r 2 R(N), the marginal contributions when v
is convex deﬁne a core allocation because the sum of the marginal contributions of any sequence
of players must at least equal the worth of their coalition (the sum when they are ﬁrst in the
order). Lemma 2.9 shows the proportional value is a weighted sum of marginal contribution
vectors. Since the core is a convex set, the result follows. ¤
83 NTU Characterization Through Consistency
Consistency is a powerful property that means, roughly, a solution concept can be applied
on a sequential basis and give the same result. Assume a ﬁrst set of players in a game
are given their values and “leave.” Consistency requires that the values of the remaining
players in the resulting reduced game are equal to their value in the complete game.
Young (1994) notes the consistent nature of many social allocation rules including rules
for the apportionment of seats in legislative bodies. Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) discuss
other applications of the consistency property in cooperative game theory. This section
shows that the output-basis proportional value is the unique NTU value consistent with
proportional bargaining in two-player TU games (i.e., equation (2.4)).
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) deﬁne a new reduced game and show that the Shapley
value is consistent with it. The worth of a coalition S in this reduced game is what
remains of the worth of their union with all reduced players i 2 T C, after the reduced
players are given their value in the game based on this union. Consistency in this paper



















Formally, consistency requires Ái(S;V
Á
T ) = Ái(S [ T C;V ), for all S µ T and all T ½ N.
Theorem 3.1 The output-basis proportional value is consistent in NTU games.
Proof: When i is reduced from a two-player game we see from (3.1) that V
'
¡i(j) = fx ·




¡i) = P(ij;V )=P(i;V ) = 'j(ij;V ). Assume ' is
consistent in games of m¡1 players or less and create V
'
¡i by reducing i from V . Then for any
S 63 i with s < m, and any j 2 S, 'j(S;V
'
¡i) = 'j(S [ i;V ). Consider the ratio potential for
V
'






¡i) = P(S [
i;V )=P((S[i)nj;V ). Thus, there must be a scalar constant c such that P(S;V
'
¡i) = c P(S[i;V )
for the potentials of all these coalitions. Now consider a coalition R 63 i with m players. The
eﬃciency of the proportional value and the deﬁnition of the reduced game requires that values










2 V (R [ i):
Thus P(R;V
'
¡i) = cP(R [ i;V ) and 'j(R;V
'
¡i) = 'j(R [ i;V ) for all j 2 R. Since additional
players can be sequentially reduced from V
'
¡i with the same result, ' must be consistent in
m-player games as well. The conclusion then follows by induction. ¤
Theorem 3.2 The output-basis proportional value is the unique consistent NTU alloca-
tion rule that, in two-player NTU games, is eﬃcient and gives players equal proportional
gains.
9Proof: Assume a second NTU allocation rule Á that is also consistent and, in two-player NTU
games, has eﬃcient equal proportional gain outcomes. Thus, ' and Á agree in two-player
games. Their singleton reduced games must agree. Consistency requires that both values in
the singleton reduced games are equal to the values in the two-player games. Thus, ' and Á
must agree for one-player games as well.
Assume that ' and Á agree for games of s ¡ 1 players or less, but not in s-player games.
Choose a coalition S with s players and any i;j 2 S. Construct the reduced games consisting




ij, one for each value, according to (3.1). The players S nij are
reduced from the game. Since ' and Á agree for games of s ¡ 1 players the individual worths
of i and j must be the same in both reduced games.
Since both rules give equal proportional gain outcomes in 2-player games and the individual
worths in both reduced games are the same, each player will gain in the same proportion in
both games. Thus both players’ allocations will be equal or larger according to one of the values
than the other. By consistency, these values are equal to player values in the game (S;V ). This
outcome applies to any pair of players in S. Thus, all players’ allocations according to one of the
rules must be at least as great as according to the other. The (output-basis) proportional value
is eﬃcient by deﬁnition. If Á is eﬃcient in s-player games it must be equal to ' in s-player
games, a contradiction. But Á must be eﬃcient in s-player games by (3.1) since it must be
eﬃcient in s ¡ 1-player games and is consistent in s-player games. ¤
The following theorem is similar to Theorem E of Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). It
shows that the output-basis NTU proportional value is determined by consistency and
principles that are independent of the NTU environment. The proof may be found in
the appendix. In Feldman (2002), I provide one characterization of TU proportional
bargaining in two-player games.
Theorem 3.3 The output-basis proportional value is the unique consistent NTU value
that, in two-player TU games, is eﬃcient and gives players equal proportional gains.
The relative importance of consistency in cooperative game theory has been unclear
since the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) conclusion that the Maschler-Owen value (1989,
1992) should be considered the proper coalitional NTU extension of the Shapley value
and Nash bargaining solutions. The dual model and the consistency of the proportional
value aﬃrm the continuing relevance of consistency to NTU cooperative value theory.
The output basis is the consistent basis.
4 Characterization Through Bilateral Cooperation
Myerson (1977) characterizes the Shapley value in a model of bilateral cooperation in
which pairs of cooperating players share the beneﬁts of cooperation equally and all pairs
of players cooperate. Parallel results are demonstrated here for the proportional value in
TU and NTU games. This section also demonstrates that the ratio potential for games
with coalition structures has a structure closely related to the diﬀerence potential for
these games. This implies that the coalition formation results of work such as Winter
(1992), Qin (1996), and Slikker (2001) also have proportional analogs.
104.1 Coalition Structures and the Ratio Potential
Let Q = fQ1;Q2;:::;Qkg be a coalition structure, a partition of the players of N into k
coalitions. For any S µ N, let the reﬁnement of S by Q be the partition of S into sub-
coalitions such that every such coalition in S=Q is the intersection of S with a component
of Q:
S=Q = fS1;S2;:::;Skg : [Si2S=QSi = S and 8Si 2 S=Q; 9Qj 2 Q s.t. Si = S \ Qj:
In TU games, deﬁne the worth v(S=Q) to be equal to the sum of worths of the subcoali-





Similarly, for NTU games, deﬁne the worth V (S=Q) to be equal to the product space of
the worths of the subcoalitions S relative to the coalition structure Q:
V (S=Q) = £Si2S=QV (Si): (4.2)
Lemma 4.1 The ratio potential of a coalition S in a game V ¤ reﬁned by a coalition






The proof may be found in the appendix. The Shapley and egalitarian values for
games with coalition structures is described by the diﬀerence potential relationship
P d(S;V ¤) =
P
Sj2S=Q P d(Sj;V ).
4.2 Bilateral Cooperation Games
In Myerson (1977) the complete worth of a coalition is only realized if all players cooperate
at least indirectly through a chain of bilateral cooperation agreements between players
in the coalition. The set of bilateral agreements in a game is its cooperation structure
and is represented by a graph g. The nodes of g are the players i 2 N. A bilateral
agreement between i and j is represented by the edge i:j 2 g. A coalition S is connected
in a coalition structure g if and only if for every i;j 2 S, there is a set of links in g
such that i:r1;r1:r2;:::;rk:j and r1;:::;rk 2 S. The notation S=g is used to represent
the partition of S into its connected subcoalitions. The worth of any coalition S given a




v(Si); and, in NTU games, as V (S=g) = £Si2S=gV (Si):
11Lemma 4.2 The TU and output-basis NTU proportional values assign equal proportional
gains to players forming a bilateral cooperation agreement.
Proof: Consider a game V with a cooperation graph g such that two players, i;j 2 S do not






and the same relationship obtains when g¤ is substituted for g. For any restricted game (S;V )
in which either i or j are missing, 'i(R;V=g) = 'i(R;V=g¤) and similarly for j because the
loss of this agreement has no eﬀect on any of the coalitions in the restricted game. Thus
'i(S;V=g¤)='i(S;V=g) = 'j(S;V=g¤)='j(S;V=g) and the result follows. ¤
Lemma 4.3 The TU and output-basis NTU proportional values of a graph-restricted
game completely distribute the worth of a connected coalition to its members. Further, if
i 2 Sj 2 T=g, T µ N, then 'i(T;V ) = 'i(Sj;V ).
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 4.1. Since the potential of a coalition is the product
of the potentials of its connected subcoalitions, we have for any i 2 Sj 2 T=g, that 'i(T;V ) =
P(T;V )=P(T ni;V ) = P(Sj;V )P(T nSj;V )=[P(Sjni;V )P(T nSj;V )] = P(Sj;V )=P(Sjni;V )=
'i(Sj;V ). By (2.1), for TU games,
P
i2Sj 'i(Sj;v) = v(Sj); and by (2.5), for NTU games,
('i(Sj;V ))i2S 2 @V (Sj). ¤
Theorem 4.1 The TU and output-basis NTU proportional values are the unique TU
and NTU values that give equal proportional gains to bilateral cooperators and completely
distribute the worth of a connected coalition to its members.
Proof: Assume there are two values which both satisfy these properties. For any game V ,
choose any minimal graph g0 such that these values produce diﬀerent allocations, and choose a
component S 2 N=g0. Since bilateral cooperators gain in equal proportion under both values,













Then because both values must agree when any link is removed, Yi(V=(g0 n i:j)) = Zi(V=(g0 n
i:j)) and Yj(V=(g0 n i:j)) = Zj(V=(g0 n i:j)). Thus, division gives Yi(V=g0)=Zi(V=g0) =
Yj(V=g0)=Zj(V=g0). Since this must be true for every such pair i;j 2 S, there must be a
constant c > 0 such that Yi(V=g0)=Zi(V=g0) = c for every i 2 S. If c = 1 then the values are
identical, but c 6= 1 contradicts the assumption of eﬃciency for both values. ¤
Remark 4.1 It is easily shown that the egalitarian value results when players receive
equal gain in NTU games.
12The Myerson (1977) bilateral cooperation game has been much cited and has been
remarkably inﬂuential in the development of cooperative game theory. In fact, while
the characterization of value by consistency and by the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996)
noncooperative game may appear to be fundamentally diﬀerent approaches; it will be seen
that, from the bilateral cooperation perspective, this noncooperative game is merely a
mechanism that properly guides the generalization of the equal gain relationship in a more
complex environment. The fact that the bilateral cooperation model naturally generates
equal proportional gain relationships is a necessary demonstration of the validity of the
dual model of value.
5 Noncooperative Characterization
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) introduce an inﬁnite horizon noncooperative bargaining
game. The game is modiﬁed here by introducing a mechanism to allow participation
probabilities to be a function of currently proposed payoﬀs. This game is used here
primarily to implement the proportional value in TU and NTU games. The egalitarian
value and an input-basis proportional value are characterized as well.
5.1 The Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) Bargaining Game
In the Hart and Mas-Colell game a player is selected in every round (stage game) to
propose a division of the worth of the coalition of the current players. If no player
rejects the proposal, the division is eﬀected and the game ends. If any player rejects,
the proposal is rejected. The game continues directly with probability ½. Otherwise a
negotiation breakdown occurs. The proposer is removed from the game and receives zero
ﬁnal payoﬀ, and then the next round begins. A player is assumed to always accept a
proposal when indiﬀerent between acceptance and rejection. There is no time discounting.
A payoﬀ conﬁguration is a set of payoﬀ vectors, a = faSgSµN, one for each S µ N.
Each aS speciﬁes payoﬀs for all i 2 S with player i receiving ai
S when the players are
S. The proposed payoﬀ a
j
S;k is to j by k when the remaining players are S. Player k’s
complete proposal to the members of S is aS;k. Boldface indicates a proﬁle of proposal
strategies, so that aS represents a complete proposal proﬁle for the players in S and
a = faSgS½N is a complete strategy proﬁle. Proposals are required to be nonnegative
and feasible in order to simplify the participation mechanism.
Section 2.1 requires NTU games to be comprehensive, closed, bounded, and positive.
In order to guarantee the existence of equilibria in general NTU games, feasible sets
are also required be smooth, nonlevel, and convex. Smoothness means that the tangent
hyperplane at any point x 2 @V (S) is well-deﬁned. A surface is nonlevel if the outward
normal vector at any point in the surface is positive in all directions. Convexity requires
that for any x;y 2 V (S), and any ® : 0 · ® · 1, ®x + (1 ¡ ®)y 2 V (S) as well.
Further, games must be weakly monotonic. A TU game is weakly monotonic if S ¾ T
13implies v(S) ¸ v(T). An NTU game V is weakly monotonic if S ¾ T implies V (S) ¶
V (T)£f0SnTg. Any feasible allocation for the players of T, x 2 V (T) must also feasible
in V (S). These are the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) assumptions.
Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) Proposition 1 develops the basic conditions of the SSP
equilibrium for both TU and NTU games and extend these conditions to games with
unequal participation probabilities. This result depends on the monotonicity condition.
Let ∆S be an s-simplex, and let pS 2 ∆S be a vector of participation probabilities for the




SaS;j be the expected payoﬀ vector for S given proposal
proﬁle aS, where p
j
S is the probability of j being selected to propose when the players





S + (1 ¡ ½)a
j
Snk; (5.1)
for all j;k 2 S, j 6= k, and all S µ N. Each player is oﬀered the weighted average of its
continuation value in the current stage game and the continuation value conditional on
ejection of the proposer. The weights are the probabilities of continuation and breakdown.
Hart and Mas-Colell’s Proposition 9 implies that continuation values in TU games












S (v(S) ¡ v(S n j)): (5.2)
A hyperplane game is an NTU game where the eﬃcient surfaces of coalitional feasibil-
ity sets are hyperplanes. The marginal rates of substitution between player allocations
are deﬁned by a ﬁxed set of ¸-transfer weights. Thus V (S) = fx 2 RS : x ¢ ¸S · VSg,
where ¸S 2 RS
++ and VS > 0. Hart and Mas-Colell show equation (5.2) generalizes



































In both (5.2) and (5.3), a player’s continuation value is the sum of its expected payoﬀs
contingent on the departure of each of the other players, each weighted by the participa-
tion probability of the other player, plus its marginal contribution weighted by its own
probability of participation. Note the similarity of these conditions to Lemma 2.8.
Multiple equilibria may exist in general NTU games. Let ΓS : ∆S ¶ (V (S)\RS
+)S be
the correspondence identifying the equilibrium proposals in a stage game with the players
in S as a function of participation probabilities, expected payoﬀs in games based on the
immediate subcoalitions, and ½. The following lemma demonstrates technical properties
of ΓS needed later. The proof may be found in the appendix.
Lemma 5.1 For every 0 · ½ < 1 the stage game equilibrium correspondence ΓS is con-
tinuous and single valued in TU and hyperplane games. It is (i) upper hemi-continuous,
(ii) locally unique, and (iii) lower hemi-continuous in general NTU games.
145.2 Proposed Payoﬀ-Weighted Participation Games
A proposed payoﬀ-weighted participation mechanism is a function Ξ : (V (S)\RS
+)S ! ∆S
that determines participation probabilities on the basis of players’ proposed payoﬀs. A
bargaining game incorporating this mechanism is a proposed payoﬀ-weighted participa-
tion game. As an extension to the Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) bargaining game, the
mechanism works as follows: In every round, all current players submit proposals. The
mechanism then determines participation probabilities and selects a player’s proposal
accordingly. The mechanism allows ineﬃcient bids, as in the original game.




S;k and deﬁne a0
S;k = 1
s(v(S) ¡ ˆ aS;k). In NTU games,
deﬁne a0
S;k as the solution to the equation (a
j
S;k + a0
S;k)j2S 2 @V (S). Then deﬁne player
j’s adjusted proposed payoﬀ by k as a
j
S;k + a0
S;k and player j’s adjusted average proposed








S;k). The mechanism Ξ0 sets
p
i








Player’s participation probabilities under Ξ0 are proportional to their average adjusted
proposed payoﬀs. Proposed payoﬀs in an ineﬃcient proposal are adjusted to make the
adjusted proposal eﬃcient. Adjustment applies only to the determination of participation
probabilities. Adjustment guarantees the continuity of pS as a function of aS.
In NTU games proposals may be ¸-weighted. In general NTU games the average of
players’ proposals will not usually be eﬃcient. Therefore an appropriate point in @V (S)
is selected in order to generate ¸ weights. Let a¤
S = ·(aS) be the intersection of the ray
passing from the origin through the average proposal ¯ aS and @V (S), and let ¸(a¤
S) be the
weights associated with the hyperplane tangent to V (S) at a¤
S. Now deﬁne player j’s ¸-




S;k) and j’s ¸-weighted adjusted





S. The ¸-weighted proposed payoﬀ-weighted
participation mechanism Ξ¸ is then deﬁned as
p
i








Lemma 5.2 The Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining game modiﬁed by incorporating a con-
tinuous participation mechanism Ξ has an SSP equilibrium in TU, hyperplane, and gen-
eral NTU games for every 0 · ½ < 1. In every such equilibrium all proposals are eﬃcient
and the ﬁrst proposal is accepted by all players.
Proof: Equilibria trivially exist for the singleton coalitions. Assume that an equilibrium strategy
proﬁle of the game including a continuous participation mechanism exists for all R ½ S. Let
cS = fcS;jgj2S be the proposals submitted to the mechanism when the current players are
S and eS = feS;jgj2S be player’s equilibrium proposals conditional on pS = Ξ(cS) and (5.4)
or (5.5). For any equilibrium proposal proﬁle eS, e
j
S;k ¸ 0, for every j;k 2 S and for every
15k 2 S, eS;k must be eﬃcient, by Hart and Mas-Colell Proposition 1 (minimally modiﬁed to allow
unequal proposal probabilities) and the positivity and monotonicity of V . Further, conditional
on reaching any stage game, Hart and Mas-Colell Proposition 1 guarantees that an equilibrium
proposal will be immediately accepted by all players.
In hyperplane NTU games, cS;k and eS;k must lie within the compact, closed, convex set
Ak
S = fx 2 RS
+ : ¸¢x · vSg. (In TU games ¸ = 1.) Let AS
S = £k2SAk
S. The composition of any
continuous participation mechanism Ξ with (5.2) in TU games or (5.3) in hyperplane games and
then (5.1) clearly generates a continuous function AS
S ! AS
S. In general NTU games, cS and eS
are elements of (V (S)\RS
+)S. Lemma 5.1 shows the correspondence ΓS : ∆S ¶ (V (S)\RS
+)S
is upper- and lower hemi-continuous and locally unique. This implies ΓS is a set of non-
intersecting continuous functions. Select one of these functions, f¤(pS). The composition
f¤ ¢ Ξ : (V (S) \ RS
+)S ! (V (S) \ RS
+)S is clearly continuous as well. In all cases then, a ﬁxed
point must exist by the Brouwer ﬁxed point theorem. Further, all equilibrium proposals in the
ﬁxed point mapping must be eﬃcient since all proposals eS;j 2 eS are eﬃcient. The conclusion
follows by induction. ¤
5.3 Implementation of the Proportional Value
Theorem 5.1 When the underlying cooperative game is TU, and in the limit as ½ ! 1,
the (TU) proportional value deﬁnes payoﬀs in the unique equilibrium of the modiﬁed Hart
and Mas-Colell bargaining game incorporating participation mechanism Ξ0.
Proof: By Lemma 5.2 a proposed payoﬀ-weighted participation equilibrium exists for every
0 · ½ < 1. In the limit as ½ ! 1, aS;j ! aS for every j 2 S and all S µ N. Thus
¯ aS;j ! aS. The proportional value is the equilibrium proposal proﬁle for singleton coalitions.
Assume this is true for all coalitions R ½ S. If ai
S = 'i(S;v), then pi
S can be written pi
S =
1=v(S) £ (P(S;v)=P(S n i;v)). Clearly
P
i2S pi
S = 1. Lemma 2.8 shows that the proportional
value is a solution to equation (5.2). Thus, the proportional value is an equilibrium payoﬀ
conﬁguration by induction. Uniqueness follows from Lemma 5.3. ¤
Lemma 5.3 When the outcomes of cooperation are deﬁned by an NTU hyperplane game,
and in the limit as ½ ! 1, the output-basis proportional value deﬁnes payoﬀs in the
unique equilibrium of the modiﬁed Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining game incorporating
participation mechanism Ξ¸.
Proof: Lemma 5.2 guarantees that there is an equilibrium for every ½. Proceed by induction.
The result is trivially true for singleton coalitions. Assume that ai
R = 'i(R;V ) for all i 2 R ½ S.
In equilibrium, and in the limit as ½ ! 1, ¯ bi
S ! ¸i
Sai





























S. Now replace ' for players in the immediate subcoalitions by the
potential representation, rearrange, and simplify to get
ai

















S=P(Snij;V ), for all j 2 S;j 6= i. All products a
j
SP(Snj;V ) must have the same
value since each is equal to the weighted average of all the others. Thus ai
S = 'i(S;V ) for all
i 2 S and the product is the potential P(S;V ). The conclusion follows by induction. ¤
Theorem 5.2 When the underlying cooperative game is NTU, and in the limit as ½ !
1, the output-basis proportional value deﬁnes payoﬀs in the unique equilibrium of the
modiﬁed Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining game incorporating participation mechanism
Ξ¸.
Proof: The existence of a limit equilibrium in the stage game using participation mechanism
Ξ¸ exactly parallels the existence argument in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) Proposition 8, which
requires the smoothness of @V (S). The proportional value deﬁnes a limit equilibrium payoﬀ
conﬁguration because Lemma 5.3 shows it deﬁnes the unique equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration
for the hyperplane game generated by the supporting tangent hyperplane. It deﬁnes the unique
equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration. Assume otherwise. Then there is another limit equilibrium
with a distinct supporting tangent hyperplane for at least one coalition S. All equilibria must
trivially agree for singleton coalitions. Let S be a coalition with a limit equilibrium not cor-
responding to the proportional value such that all immediate subcoalitions have unique limit
equilibria corresponding to the proportional value. Then a ratio potential deﬁnes payoﬀs for all
immediate subcoalitions. Lemma 5.3 then shows equilibrium payoﬀs must satisfy equation (5.7),
thus payoﬀs for coalition S must be described by the proportional value as well, contradicting
the assumption of a second equilibrium payoﬀ conﬁguration. ¤
5.4 Implementation of the Egalitarian Value
The egalitarian value is implemented in the Hart and Mas-Colell game by making the




Theorem 5.3 Let the probability of participation of player i be pi
S = ¸i(aS)=¸¤
S in the
stage game of the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining game with players S. Then, when the
underlying cooperative game is NTU, and in the limit as ½ ! 1, the egalitarian value
deﬁnes payoﬀs of the unique equilibrium of the game.
Proof: The argument parallels that of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.2. All that must be proved
here is that the egalitarian value deﬁnes equilibrium payoﬀs in the ¸-weighted hyperplane
game. The egalitarian value satisﬁes (5.3) for singleton coalitions. Assume that the egalitarian
value is the continuation value for players in all coalitions R ½ S. The egalitarian value has
the diﬀerence potential representation Ei(S;V ) = Pd(S;V ) ¡ Pd(S n i;V ). Replace values in


















Pd(S n k;V ) ¡ Pd(S n i;V )
¶
;
and rearrange by collecting all ai
S and P(S n i) terms and dividing by their weight to get
ai











S + Pd(S n k;V )
´
:
17A solution is ai
S = Ei(S;V ) = Pd(S;V ) ¡ Pd(S n i;V ), for all i 2 S. Since this is one equation
in a non-degenerate s-equation linear system, the solution must be unique. The hyperplane
result follows by induction. The proof for general NTU games is as for Theorem 5.2. ¤
5.5 The Input-Basis NTU Proportional Value
Since the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining framework can be used to implement linear
values with either input or output basis, the principle of duality of properties between
linear and proportional values suggests that a proportional value with input basis ex-
ists and can be implemented with a suitable participation mechanism. In fact, using
the participation mechanism Ξ0 instead of Ξ¸ leads to equilibrium payoﬀs that can be
interpreted as a proportional input-basis value.
Deﬁnition 5.1 The input-basis proportional value '¸ satisﬁes the following conditions
for every S µ N, where (iii) is for all i 2 S and the dependence on V is understood:
(i) '¸(S;V ) 2 @V (S),
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The ﬁrst condition requires that payoﬀs are eﬃcient. The second condition requires
that ¸-transfer weights ¸S are generated by the tangent hyperplane supporting V (S) at
'¸(S;V ). The ﬁnal condition is a generalized weighted proportional gain condition.
Theorem 5.4 When the underlying cooperative game is NTU, and in the limit as ½ ! 1,
the input-basis proportional value '¸ deﬁnes equilibrium payoﬀs in all equilibria of the
modiﬁed Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining game incorporating participation mechanism Ξ0.
Proof: Let pi




S. Existence of the limit equilibrium is guaranteed
by an argument parallel to the existence argument of in Theorems 5.2 and 5.3. In the limit
as ½ ! 1, pi




S. To see that aS is the input-basis proportional value,









left-hand side, multiply both sides by ¸
j










Remark 5.1 Deﬁnition 5.1 is the direct proportional analog to Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996) Proposition 4. The conditions are identical except that condition (iii) adds mul-
tiplication by 'j(S;V ) on the LHS and multiplication by 'i(S;V ) on the RHS. This
deﬁnition is a generalization of a weighted equal proportional gain condition in the sense
18that if the following condition, equation (5.8), is satisﬁed for all players then condition













'k(S;V ) ¡ 'k(S n j;V )
'k(S;V )
: (5.8)
Remark 5.2 Theorem 5.4 leads to the following characterization of the ¸-weighted pro-
portional value '¸ in two-player games:
¸1
'¸











where (¸1;¸2) = ¸('¸(12;V )), with '¸(12;V ) 2 @V (12).
5.6 Interpretation of the Noncooperative Results
Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) distill the essential characteristics of equal gain relationships
into the diﬀerence potential and the consistency property. The Hart and Mas-Colell
(1996) bargaining game jettisons consistency and the potential but reﬂects a generalized
weighted equal gain property characterized by their Proposition 4 and inherent in the
structure of the game. Weighted equal gain relationships for players in any coalition
hold “on average.” One way of understanding this generalization is to consider parallel
hyperplane games, games where ¸S = f¸i
Ngi2S. The Owen-Mashler value of these games
can be found to be equal to the weighted Egalitarian value with weights !i = 1=¸i
N.
Thus, the Owen-Mashler value is a generalization of the weighted egalitarian value where
each coalition has weights equal to the inverse of the ¸-transfer weights supporting the
value restricted to that coalition. A further evident implication is that if participation
is set such that pi
S / !i
S¸i
S, a generalized egalitarian value with independent weights for
each coalition results. (If pi
S / !i
S, a weighted Owen-Maschler value results.)
Similar reasoning implies that setting participation such that pi
S / !i'i(S;V ) iden-
tiﬁes weighted TU and input-basis NTU proportional value. When this restriction is
relaxed to allow independent weights !S for each coalition, generalized weighted pro-
portional value results. Output-basis weighted proportional value results when pi
S /
!i¸i
S'i(S;V ). Weighted values can be recursively determined by applying the conditions
of Deﬁnition 5.1, appropriately modifying condition (iii). These observations correct an
error in my earlier work. In Feldman (1999), Section 3.1.6, I proposed a weighted pro-
portional value deﬁned by V (S) =
P
i !iP !(S;V )=P !(S n i;V ). However, the weights
have no net eﬀect. This potential deﬁnes the unweighted proportional value.
A deeper implication of the noncooperative results is that equity-based relationships
are more fundamental to the characterization of cooperative value than either consistency
or potential. Further, these relationships are also more fundamental than the classical
19axiomatic approach. These inferences are already implicit in Hart and Mas-Colell’s con-
clusion that the Owen-Maschler value is the proper representation of linear NTU value.
Hart and Mas-Colell base their conclusion on the authority of the noncooperative imple-
mentation. The results developed here support this conclusion. The generalized weighted
equal and proportional gain relationships emerge directly from the equilibrium conditions
of the game. (In the terminology of the proof of Lemma 5.1, as = A
¡1
S BS.) All forms of
TU and NTU value are identiﬁable by equity-based gain conditions.
6 Games with Zero and Small Players
Zero players are players with zero individual worth. Results for games with zero players
raise the issue of how similar results would be for players with almost zero wealth. Small
players are players with individual worths that are small relative to other players. This
section derives some basic results for games with zero and small players.
6.1 Zero Players
Deﬁne Z as the coalition of all zero players. Zero coalitions are coalitions with zero
worth. In monotonic games only zero players can be in zero coalitions. Zero players may
not be null players, players that never add worth to a coalition. However, there will be
circumstances where all zero coalitions are null coalitions as well and do not add worth
in combination with coalitions S ½ N n Z. If S ½ N n Z and R is a null coalition, then,
in a TU game, v(S [ R) = v(S). If R is a null coalition in an NTU game then require
@V (S)£0R ½ @V (S[R). When the players of R receive no allocation, the set of feasible
allocations for the players of S is equal to V (S). Assign the worth of a coalition S in a
game V to a coalition T ½ S in the game W. If V and W are TU, then w(T) = v(S). In
an NTU game, the same assignment is represented by restriction of the worth V (S) to the
players in T and denoted W(T) = V (S)jT. Thus, W(T) = fx 2 RT : (x;0SnT) 2 V (S)g.
The ratio potential is not deﬁned for zero coalitions because at least one ordered
worth product will be zero. Conditions are identiﬁed here under which values for at least
some players in such games are nonetheless well-deﬁned. These results are based on limit
sequences of games. In each such sequence, the worth of non-zero coalitions is ﬁxed and
the worth of all zero coalitions goes to zero in the limit. In a TU game sequence fvpg1
p=1,
0 < vp+1(S) · vp(S) and limp!1 vp(S) = 0 for all zero coalitions. In an NTU game
sequence fVpg1
p=1, 0 ½ Vp+1(S) ½ Vp(S), and limp!1 Vp(S) = 0 for all zero coalitions.
Let fV 1
p g1
p=1 and fV 2
p g1
p=1 be two limit sequences based on V . The value of '(S;V ) is
strongly deﬁned if limp!1 '(S;V 1
p ) = limp!1 '(S;V 2
p ) for any two such sequences. Then
'(S;V ) = limp!1 '(S;Vp).
Theorem 6.1 Let V be monotonic with supfx 2 V (Z)g = 0. Then '(S;V ) is strongly
deﬁned for all S ½ N and 'i(V;S) = 0 for all S 3 i 2 Z, and 'j(V;S) > 0 for all
S 3 j 62 Z.
20Proof: Consider the TU case and sequences fvpg1
p=1 of the form vp(R) = ²pv0(R) for R µ Z and
vp(R) = v0(R) otherwise, deﬁned by a v0 and a sequence ²p ! 0. These are clearly suﬃcient to
deﬁne sequences that approximate a more general sequence in the limit. Then for any coalition



















where the summation is over all orders where all zero players in S are ﬁrst in the order. This
is because the harmonic weight of ordered worth products with weight larger then ²m
p , that is,
with fewer than m zero players at the front of the order, goes to zero. The value of a zero
player i will be the ratio of a potential with m zero players to one with m ¡ 1 players, hence
'i(S;vp) = O(²). The value of a nonzero player j 2 S is the ratio of two potentials with m zero
players, hence 'j(S;V ) À 0 and is well-deﬁned.
For the NTU case, consider the recursive deﬁnition of the potential and NTU sequences as
described for the TU case. For any S ½ Z, clearly P(S;Vp) = ²m
p P(S;V ) and when S \Z = Ø,
P(S;Vp) = P(S;V ). When m = jS \ Zj > 0, the potentials of immediate subcoalitions with
m zero players have the highest harmonic weight and must dominate as p ! 1 so P(S;Vp) =
O(²m). Thus for a zero player i, 'i(S;Vp) = O(²) and the value for non-zero players is positive
and well-deﬁned. ¤
Corollary 6.1 Let V be monotonic with supfx 2 V (Z)g = 0. Let W be a game based
on the players N n Z. Deﬁne W(S) = V (S [ Z)jS. Then 'i(V ) = 'i(W).
Proof: In the TU case, for any order rSnZ of the players in S n Z there is an order r in the
summation of equation (6.1) for every order rS\Z of players in S\Z such that r = (rS\Z;rSnZ).
Thus P(S;Vp) ¼ ²m
p cP(S n Z;W), where c > 0 depends only on S \ Z. In the NTU case,
'S(S [Z;V ) 2 @W(S) for all S µ N nZ since 'k(S [Z;V ) = 0 for all j 2 Z and ' is eﬃcient.
Since 'S(S [ Z;V ) has the equal proportional gain property for players i;j 2 S, it must be
equal to 'S(S;W) as well, both assertions due to Lemma 2.5. ¤
Theorem 6.2 Let V be monotonic with (i) supfx 2 V (Z)g > 0, (ii) supfx 2 V (S)g = 0
for S ( Z, and (iii) all S ( Z are null coalitions. Then (1) 'j(S;V ) > 0 is well-deﬁned
for all S 3 j 62 Z, (2) when S ¾ Z,
P
i2Z 'i(S;V ) > 0 is well-deﬁned, and (3) when
S 6¾ Z, 'i(S;V ) = 0 for i 2 Z.
Proof: Consider the TU case. For any S such that Z 6µ S, Theorem 6.1 applies. When S ) Z,
for any i 62 Z and j 2 Z the following relation may be obtained by summing over proportionality
relationships (2.5) between i and the players j 2 Z:





'i(Z [ i n j;vp) 'j(Z [ i;vp): (6.2)
21Theorem 6.1 requires limp!1 'i(Z [ i n j;vp) = v(Z [ i n j) and because v is coalitionally null,
limp!1 vp(Z [ i n j) = v(i). Equation (6.2) then simpliﬁes and can be solved for 'i(vp;Z [ i):
lim
p!1
'i(Z [ i;vp) =
v(i)
v(Z) + v(i)
v(Z [ i): (6.3)
For any S ) Z, and in the limit as p ! 1, the players of Z may be treated as a merged player
by the following argument. For i;j 2 Z \ S and k 2 S n Z we have 'i(S;v)='i(S n k;v) =
'k(S;v)='k(S n i;v) and 'j(S;v)='j(S n k;v) = 'k(S;v)='k(S n j;v) by Lemma 2.5. But
since all R ( Z are coalitionally null, 'k(S n i;v) = 'k(S n j;v) by Theorem 6.1. Therefore
'i(S;v)='i(S n k;v) = 'j(S;v)='j(S n k;v). Let 'Z(S;v) represent the collective allocation to
the players of Z. Note equation (6.3) implies 'Z(R;v) > 0 when m = z + 1 and v(Z) > 0.
For any S ¾ Z, value relationships satisfy Lemma 2.5 when the players in Z are considered
as a merged player. Given 'Z(Z [ j;V ) and 'j(Z [ j;V ) are well-deﬁned for any j 62 Z, equal
proportional gain relationships must deﬁne the values for Z and all other players in S as well
and the conclusion follows. The NTU case is identical in structure. (Worths of coalitions must
replaced by the sum of values of players, e.g., vp(S) is replaced by
P
i2S 'i(S;Vp)). ¤
Corollary 6.2 Let v be a TU game satisfying conditions (i) – (iii) of Theorem 6.2. Let
w be an m¡z+1 player game with player set (N nZ)[k, where k “represents” the zero
coalition. Deﬁne w(S) = v((S [Z)nk) for all S 3 k, and w(S) = v(S) otherwise. Then
w is strongly deﬁned, 'i(v) = 'i(w) for i 2 N n Z, and
P
j2Z 'j(v) = 'k(w).
Remark 6.1 Construct a statistical cooperative game (Feldman (2002)) associated with
a statistical model by making a one-to-one correspondence between players and indepen-
dent variables and deﬁning the worth of a coalition to be the marginal contribution to
explained variance of its associated independent variables. If a subset of independent
variables Z are all identical, the game meets conditions (i) – (iii) of Theorem 6.2. More
complex forms of multicollinearity result in variations on this basic game.
6.2 Small Players
What are the implications of value allocation to zero players for small players, players
that are small, but have positive individual worth? Let v be a positive, symmetric TU




i), where, again, Rr
i is the coalition of the ﬁrst i players in the order r.
Let Z be the coalition of all small players, with m = jZj. Let zS = jS \ Zj. Deﬁne the
small player game v´ for an 0 < ´ < 1 as
v´(S) =
½
v(S) if S 6µ Z; and
´ v(S) otherwise. (6.4)
22Lemma 6.1 Let v´ be a game with small players derived from a symmetric game v











Proof: The value of any ordered worth product is a function of the number of coalitions R µ Z
in the order. If there are k such coalitions in an order r, then
Qs
i=1 v(Rr
i) = ´kKS. Calculating
the potential is then a counting exercise. For 0 < k · zS, there are zS!=(zS¡k)!(s¡zS)(s¡k¡1)!
orders where k small players are the ﬁrst k players in an order, and a regular player follows.
Factoring out common terms and rearranging leads to the result. ¤
Corollary 6.3 Let v´ be a game with small players based on a positive, symmetric, TU










This result generalizes easily to games with a hierarchy of player classes. Again start
with a positive, symmetric, TU game v. Deﬁne a partition of S, P = fS1;S2;:::;Skg
and a vector ´¤ = (´¤
1;´¤
2;:::;´¤
k), with 0 < ´¤
i ¿ ´¤
j for i < j. Also deﬁne Zj = [
j
i=1Si.
Then deﬁne the hierarchical game v´¤ as follows:
v´¤(S) = ´
¤
j v(S) for j : S µ Zj and S \ Sj 6= Ø: (6.5)
The element of the ´¤ vector applied to v(S) is determined by the highest size class
represented in S. For a coalition S, let zS = (zS1;zS2;:::zSk) be a vector representing
the number of players of each size class, i.e., s =
Pk
i=1 zSi. The potential function for v´¤
is more complex than for (6.4), but from Lemma 6.1 it can be seen that the leading term of
the summation should determine the potential when the diﬀerences between consecutive
elements of ´¤ are suﬃciently large. Therefore, consider only orders where the players of
size class Si all are before the players of class Sj, for all i < j. There are zS1! zS2! ¢¢¢ zSk!
such orders. For each such r 2 R(S),
Qs
i=1 v(Rr















zS1! zS2! ¢¢¢ zSk!
: (6.6)
Theorem 6.3 Let v¤
´ be a game with hierarchical small players based on a positive sym-
metric TU game v, hierarchical partition P = fS1;S2;:::;Skg, and ´¤ > 0. Then for










23Proof: Start with (6.6) and use P(S n i;v´¤)=P(S n j;v´¤) = 'i(S;v´¤)='j(S;v´¤) to show that
´¤
j zSi'i(S;v´¤) ¼ ´¤
i zSj 'j(S;v´¤). Sum over j on both sides and solve for 'i(S;v´¤). ¤
Computational experiments suggest that an order of magnitude diﬀerence between
consecutive elements of ´¤ is usually more than suﬃcient to obtain close approximation
to the true value even in games with relatively small numbers of players.
Theorem 6.3 shows that proportional value allocation in these hierarchical games is
approximately pure proportional bargaining between the player classes. Class i’s alloca-
tion is proportional to ´¤
i and is independent of the number of its members zSi.
Remark 6.2 The primary purpose of these games is to estimate an upper bound on
the expected allocations to small players using generally liberal assumptions regarding
their potential contributions to general coalitions. It is necessary, however, to place an
upper limit on the maximum possible contributions of small players. Here this limit is
the marginal contribution of the largest players. This is the reason for the underlying
symmetric game. If a small player’s contributions to coalitions including large players is
large enough (they must be proportionally larger than the individual worths are small),
the impact of small individual worth can be overcome.
A general interpretation of these games consistent with their structure could be as
information games. All players are equal except for the information they possess. All
players of the same class possess the same information. The information of any class
includes the information of all classes below it. The information possessed by a coalition
is union of all information held by its players.
7 Monopoly in a Production Game
Consider a game with a single large player B that controls a ﬁrst factor of production x
and n¡1 small players with equal shares of a second ﬁxed factor of production y. Proﬁts
from production are described by a generalized Cobb-Douglas function. Coalition S






»x® when S = fBg
y
¯
S = [ s
n¡1 y]¯ when B 62 S
x®y
¯
S = x®[ s¡1
n¡1 y]¯ otherwise;
(7.1)
where 0 < » · vn(i) for i 6= B, x > 1 and y = yN > 1 are ﬁxed, and ®;¯ > 0. When the
ﬁrst factor is missing production takes place with value y
¯
S. The normalization factor »
determines the net value of production when the second factor is not present. If » > vn(i),
i 6= B, then vn(B) > vn(Bi) and vn is not superadditive. If vn(i) > 1 for i 6= B, it is
convenient to consider » = 1. Non-transferrable utility, costs, and prices are not modelled
in order to allow an analytic solution. If ¯ > 1 it can be assumed that production is
24taking place on an increasing returns portion of the production function since the total
quantities of productive factors are ﬁxed.
The game could represent either a monopolist seller of a input needed by small pro-
ducers or a monopsonist purchaser of the small producers’ product. Intuitively, the small
players are at an increasing bargaining disadvantage as their numbers grow large. In the
limit, they should be price-takers.
The proportional value of player B in any coalition S may be determined by comput-
ing the potentials of vn(S) and vn(S n B). Every ordered worth product contributing to
a potential P(S;vn) with B 62 S is the same: [s!ys
S=ss]¯. Then P(S;vn) = s!¯¡1s¡s¯y
s¯
S
for B 62 S. When S = B, P(S;vn) = »x®. When B ( S, B will show up at any position
in an order with equal probability. The resulting coalition, and all following will have
worth increased by the factor x® over the worth without B. If B enters at position k
then the magnitude of the ordered worth product increases by x®(s¡k+1). Also, when B
enters at k, there is an additional correction because the coalitions Rr
k and Rr
k¡1 both
have (k ¡ 1)=(s ¡ 1)yS units of the second productive factor. There are (s ¡ 1)! orders






































Consider 'B(vn) as n ! 1. The ﬁrst term goes to zero. The summation may




i=1[x®]¡i. In the limit
as n ! 1,
P1
i=1[x®]¡i = (x® ¡ 1)¡1. The second component with individual terms
x¡i®y
¡¯






Core allocations in this game require a collective allocation to the small players of at
least y¯ when ¯ ¸ 1. (When ¯ < 1 the core does not exist in the limit since collective
individually rational allocations to small players become inﬁnite: limn!1(n ¡ 1)[1=(n ¡
1)y]¯ = 1:) As the number of small players grows their total value shrinks to their
minimum core allocation when ¯ ¸ 1.
Remark 7.1 Since vn can be interpreted as being derived from a symmetric game where
v(S) = (s=n y)¯ by rule (6.4), the results of Theorem 6.3 apply when x® À 1. Set
´¤ = (1;x®), which is approximately correct in the limit (it is not true for v(B)), and
Theorem 6.3 implies limn!1 'B(vn) = x2®y¯=(x®+1). Thus if x® = 3, the approximation
implies 'B(vn) = 2:25y¯, whereas the exact result is 2y¯.
25The Shapley value for this game may also be determined. The marginal contribution
of player B is »x¯ when no other players are in S, and is (x® ¡1)y
¯
S otherwise. Then for































In the limit B’s Shapley value is half its proportional value when the second factor
exhibits constant returns to scale. For every ¯ > 0, ShB < 'B. Observe that ShB(vn)
decreases as n grows. To see this, consider the interval [(i ¡ 1)=(n ¡ 1);i=(n ¡ 1)].
For any x in this interval except the right boundary, x¯ < (i=(n ¡ 1))¯. Therefore
1=s
Ps¡1
i=1(i=(s ¡ 1))¯ <
R 1
0 i¯di.
The Shapley value of B should be expected to decrease as the number of small players
increases primarily because their collective probability of selection to propose is increas-
ing as well. As this probability increases, the weight on B’s marginal contribution in
the computation of the continuation value by equation (5.2) (with equal participation
probabilities) decreases. In the case of the proportional value, ﬁrst, since v is convex
for ¯ ¸ 1, '(vn) 2 core(vn) by Theorem 2.1. This places a lower limit on the payoﬀs
to small players. Allocations to small players are driven down to this point by B’s high
probability of selection to propose under proportional value allocation combined with the
steep drop in their payoﬀs when B is removed from the game.
Remark 7.2 Let (a1;a2), be an allocation where the ﬁrst allocation is to B and the
second is the sum of allocations to all small players. Since all solutions to be considered
are eﬃcient, a1 + a2 = x®y¯. When ¯ ¸ 1 the core is deﬁned by a2 2 [y¯;x®y¯). The
nucleolus and kernel both give a1 = 1
2(x® ¡ 1)y¯, the Shapley value solution when ¯ = 1.










These results are consistent with the literature on nonatomic games with large players.
For example, Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz (1999) show the asymptotic nucleolus is equal
or larger than the Shapley value in nonatomic exchange economies.
8 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper presents a model of cooperative value as the extension of the traditional
fairness or equity-based methods of sharing to coalitional cooperative games. The basic
26forms of cooperative value are shown to be concisely represented in this framework.
Section 5.6 makes the case that this framework, derivative of Myerson (1977 and 1980),
should be considered the fundamental characterization of cooperative value.
The Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) bargaining game has been used here, and by Hart
and Mas-Colell, primarily as an instrument. This game has some undesirable features
which, however, should be of little consequence here. There are no alternative noncoop-
erative models of NTU value. The TU and output-basis equilibria agree with the equity,
consistency, and potential models of value. The input-basis equilibria deﬁne generalized
equity relationships. These generalizations, described by Hart and Mas-Colell Proposi-
tion 4 and by Deﬁnition 5.1 here, have independent signiﬁcance. They can be seen to
be the natural result of extending the input-basis bargaining model to coalitional games
by allowing for the variation in marginal rates of eﬃcient substitution between players’
utilities characteristic of general NTU games (see Section 5.6).
Implementation of output-basis values requires ¸-weighting of participation probabil-
ities. This may appear awkward. A functional institutional perspective is that practices
embodying such characteristics will evolve if there is a preference for the outcomes they
produce. Output-basis bargaining is similar to bargaining over after-tax dollars or ser-
vices received instead of the cost of provision. Clearly, there are situations where bar-
gaining appears to take place on this basis. Regardless, this paper establishes that the
proportional mode is not only a creature of the output basis in NTU games.
The dual model does not determine which type of value should be observed in any
particular circumstance. The properties, characterizations, and examples presented here,
however, should be a useful starting point for the formation of hypotheses. In particular,
the production game of Section 7 clearly implies that the proportional mode may useful
in the study of bargaining power in imperfectly competitive economic environments.
Returning to an issue raised in the introduction, the invariance of physical allocations
to aﬃne transformations of players’ utility functions is a cornerstone of economic and
game theory. Myerson (1992:18) advises suspicion of “any theory of economic behavior”
without this property. Hart and Mas-Colell cross the path that leads to these results but
explicitly reject the study of proportionality for just this reason (1989:595).
Invariance implies the impossibility of interpersonal comparison of utility. Aversion
to interpersonal comparisons of utility in general economic theory and in social choice
theory is not surprising since either impersonal market forces or a “central planner” would
have to make these comparisons. In bargaining, however, these assessments must be
understood to be made by the bargainers themselves. Whether or not such comparisons
can actually be properly made, there is little question that agreement on such comparisons
is regarded as an important component of successful bargaining outcomes (see, e.g.,
Thompson (1998)). Proportional mode and input basis values provide a theoretical
structure for the representation of these comparisons. In this respect, my argument
bears some resemblance to the proposition that individual utility functions should allow
reference points or frames (e.g., the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979)).
In fact, assuming players to have expected utility functions speciﬁcally enables in-
27terpersonal comparison of utility. Proportional allocation requires agreement on appro-
priate reference points to base computation of proportional gains. The translations of
bargainers’ nominal utility functions implied by these reference points are guaranteed to
still properly represent their preferences under expected utility. Similarly, in egalitarian
allocation bargainers must implicitly or explicitly agree on rescalings of their utility func-
tions so that units represent equal amounts of utility. These rescalings will still properly
represent the preferences of players with expected utility functions. To be sure, our in-
terpretation of players’ utility functions must then be that are no longer fully invariant
precisely because they incorporate the relevant interpersonal comparisons.
The dual model may also provide a productive framework for the study of problems
where invariance is not remotely an issue. For example, in a statistical cooperative game
the worth of a coalition represents the explanatory power of an associated set of indepen-
dent variables in a statistical model. Feldman (2002) shows that two existing variance
decomposition methods can be understood as the Shapley value of statistical cooperative
games; and that consistency, non-negativity of decompositions, and a weakened form
of linearity in two-player games uniquely identiﬁes proportional variance decomposition.
Cooperative methods may be applicable to other such joint-eﬀects problems.
It appears that proportional bargaining has never been tested for, either experimen-
tally or otherwise. Much might be learned simply from the reanalysis of studies of
two-player bargaining situations. Most bargaining experiments set individual worths to
zero, eﬀectively eliminating the possibility of proportional bargaining. However, empir-
ical studies such as Svejnar’s (1986) study of union bargaining and the now extensive
studies of bargaining eﬀects in intrahousehold resource allocation following Manser and
Brown (1980) represent a wealth of data. Particularly in the case of intrahousehold re-
source allocation, it appears that the formulation of a test of a proportional bargaining
hypothesis should not be too diﬃcult. Nash bargaining implies that the eﬀect of an extra
dollar of maternal income should be independent of the level of maternal income.
The experimental record with respect to the basis of NTU bargaining outcomes in
linear bargaining environments is very diﬀerent. Since Nydegger and Owen (1974), tests
of Nash bargaining have revealed the strong tendency of subjects to reach equal sharing
agreements. (See, particularly, Weg, Rapoport, and Felsenthal (1990). See Roth (1995)
for a survey.) Measures such as anonymity and denying “weaker” bargainers knowledge of
other player’s payoﬀs appear necessary to generate a high frequency of Nash-like results.
Surprisingly, no experimental study or commentary appears to consider the fact that
such outcomes have a theoretical basis represented by the egalitarian value.
9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Theorem 3.3
Given Theorem 3.2 all that must be proved is that consistency with equal proportional gain
bargaining in TU two-player games implies it in NTU two-player games as well. The proof
28strategy is the same as in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) Lemma 6.9: A two-player NTU game
(ij;V ) is embedded in a three-player game (ijk; b V ) whose other coalitional worths are all
transferable. Because b V (ijk) is equivalent to a transferable worth, all games reduced by one
player are equivalent to TU games. Consistency identiﬁes the values of the original game.
Let ®i = supfxi 2 V (i)g, deﬁne ®j similarly, and set ®k > 0. Deﬁne b V as follows:
b V (S) =
½
V (S) S = i; j; or ij; ©







Let Á satisfy the conditions of the theorem and let (yi;y2;y3) = Á(ijk; b V ). Deﬁne TU versions




¡j, and b v
Á
¡k. In b v
Á
¡i and b v
Á
¡j the individual worths of i
and j must be their values under Á(ij;V ), which is what is left over after the other player is
given his value under Á(ij;V ), by eﬃciency and the deﬁnition of the reduced game. All other
two-player games are additive so players get their individual worth:
b v
Á
¡i(j) = Áj(ij;V ); b v
Á
¡i(k) = ®k; b v
Á
¡i(ik) = yj + yk;
b v
Á
¡j(i) = Ái(ij;V ); b v
Á
¡j(k) = ®k; b v
Á
¡j(jk) = yi + yk;
b v
Á
¡k(i) = ®i; b v
Á
¡k(j) = ®j; b v
Á
¡k(ij) = yi + yj:
The TU values for these games are easily calculated from (2.4). Since Á is consistent, these
games generate a system of equations equating allocations in two of the reduced games, one for
each player. Dividing Ái(b v
Á
¡j) by Áj(b v
Á
¡i) and substituting on the left-hand side gives
Ái(ijk; b V )

















The game b v
Á
¡k implies that Ái(ijk; b V )=Áj(ijk; b V ) = ®i=®j. Equating Ák(b v
Á
¡i) and Ák(b v
Á
¡j) in




¡i(j)+®k) = (yi+yk)=(yj +yk). Using these results
to simplify the principal equation and substituting Ái(ij;V ) = b v
Á
¡j(i) and Áj(ij;V ) = b v
Á
¡i(j)
shows that Ái(ij;V )=®i = Áj(ij;V )=®j. By Theorem 3.2, Á = '. ¤
9.2 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Assume the lemma is true for all immediate subcoalitions of S and consider the potential of S.
For an i 2 Si,










where the second step results from multiplying the numerator and denominator of the right-
hand terms by P(Si;V ). Rearranging leads to
'i(Si;V ) =
P(Si;V )




P(S n i;V ¤)
: (9.2)
29Since this relation is true for every i, the product must be the potential. For n = 2 the only
nontrivial coalition structure is Q = f1;2g. Then V ¤(ij) = V (ij=Q) = fx : xi · V (i);xj ·
V (j)g. In this case (9.2) reduces to P(i;V ) = P(i;V ) = 'i(i;V ) = supfx : x 2 V (i)g. The
conclusion follows by induction. ¤
9.3 Proof of Lemma 5.1
By Hart and Mas-Colell Proposition 6 an eﬃcient SSP equilibrium exists for every 0 · ½ < 1.
Let the weights ¸S;j = (¸k
S;j)k2S and the constant V
j
S > 0 deﬁne the tangent hyperplane
supporting player j’s equilibrium proposal aS;j 2 @V (S) for all k 2 S. Substitute into Hart



























S = 1 ¡ ½ + ½pi
S.
Deﬁne the s£1 column vector BS with Bi








Sni. Then ASaS = BS.




S exists if and only if the matrix ΛS, generated by multiplying each row by
¸i
S;i=(½pi















ΛS can be interpreted as deﬁning the polyhedral cone associated with the convex cone generated
by the intersection of the half-spaces deﬁned by the supporting tangent hyperplanes deﬁned by
¸S and fV
j
Sgj2S. Equation (9.3) shows that the eﬀective weight deﬁning a player’s self allocation
increases with decreases in ½. An increasing ¸-transfer weight implies that this player’s utility is
more “costly” to produce. Then if ½1 < ½2, the cone generated by ½1 is clearly contained in the
cone generated by ½2. Thus, for ½ < 1, equation (9.3) shows the cone must have s generators,
even in TU and hyperplane games. (In the case of pi
S = 0 for at least one player i, modify Λ
by multiplying row i by pi
S for all such players. Then Λ
ij
S = 0 for j 6= i and Λii
S = ¸i
S;i(1 ¡ ½).
Λ is still clearly nonsingular since ΛSx = 0 implies xi = 0 for every i such that pi
S = 0. The
submatrix deﬁned by the rows and columns of players with pi
S > 0 is immediately seen to be
nonsingular.) Thus, ΛSx = 0 implies x = 0 and A¡1
S exists for every equilibrium proposal
proﬁle generated by any pS 2 ∆S.
For TU and hyperplane NTU games, and for a ﬁxed ½, AS and BS are functions only of pS.
Therefore ΓS(pS) = A¡1
S (pS)BS(pS). Clearly, ΓS is single-valued and continuous in this case.
Evidently, this result characterizes both (5.2) (Hart and Mas-Colell Proposition 9) and (5.3).
Now consider the general NTU case. Assume a ﬁxed ½, sequence pSi ! pS and sequences
¸S(pSi) ! ¸S, AS(pSi) ! A¤
S, aS(pSi) ! a¤
S, and BS(pSi) ! B¤




S(pSi) for every pSi. Then A¤
Sa¤
S = B¤
S and ΓS is upper hemi-continuous.
Local uniqueness and lower-hemicontinuity follow from application of the implicit function
theorem. Let F(pS;cS) = AS(pS;¸(PS))cS ¡ BS(pS;¸(PS)), for cS in a neighborhood U 2 RS
of aS where AS(pS;¸(pS))aS = BS(pS;¸(pS)). Clearly, F(pS;aS) = 0. Further, @F=@pS(cS)
is continuous due to (5.1) and the smoothness of @V (S) (@V (S) must be at least C2). With
these conditions, together with the existence of A¡1(pS;¸(pS)), the implicit function theorem
guarantees the local uniqueness of ΓS and it continuity. ¤
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